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All European lawyers are well acquainted with the fact that American 
civil procedure is different from the Code we celebrate at this 
conference.   A few years ago, the German Minister of Justice 
proclaimed that America has a “lousy legal system.” 1  And anyone 
acquainted with the differences would acknowledge that the 
institutions drawn from European civil code traditions are much more 
efficient than is the American system when it comes to resolving 
private disputes.   
 
If America were more homogeneous and were served by a 
democratic parliamentary government responsive to the concerns of 
all those it governed, few would doubt the United States would be 
better served by a civil process more similar to that provided by the 
civil code.  But the distinctive features of American law explaining the 
Minister’s assessment were and are indispensable to such 
democracy as we enjoy in the United States today.   
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In parliamentary governments serving smaller populations sharing a 
greater measure of public trust, it may well be best to depend largely, 
as Europeans generally have, on bureaucracies and prosecutors for 
the enforcement of laws enacted to protect workers, consumers, 
individual investors, debtors, patients, and the environment.   
It is indeed my impression that the bureaucracies overseen by many 
European parliaments are reasonably effective at enforcing most 
public laws.   
 
But in America, the distinction between public and private law  
is muddled. Of course we have bureaucracies and some are 
reasonably effective.  Business says to excess.  But American 
governments seldom rely fully on their own officials to protect their 
concerns.  We urge private citizens to help government regulate 
business.  Private rights are created for public purposes. 
 
Reasons for this can be found in the history of our nation.   Given the 
similarities between 19th century America and the present state of the 
world, the novelties of American law might be taken to suggest  
issues worthy of consideration by any future planners of globalization 
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who recognize needs to protect interests other than contract or 
property rights.   Maybe the time is coming to devise procedures for 
private enforcement of transnational law. 
 
The idea of private enforcement of public law emerged in America  
in the decades after the Civil War that had torn a fragile nation apart.   
Nominal peace came in 1865.  Soon thereafter, the rail lines being 
laid in every direction united a transcontinental economy serving 
populations afflicted with many causes for mutual mistrust.   The last 
spike driven to complete the first transcontinental road was 
designated as the Golden Spike, and it proved to be so. 
Manufacturing soon became more important than farming.   It took 
only a decade or so after the War before numerous capitalist lions 
amassed great fortunes, often by exploiting the weaknesses of an 
urbanizing lower class.  The late 19th century was America’s Gilded 
Age.  In major respects, the nation was ripe for Marxism.  A reason 
that Marxism never gained solid traction in America is that Americans 
regarded their courthouses as dispensers of justice.   And the political 
leadership of that time recognized that the regulation of aggressive 
capitalists inconsiderate of the interests of fellow citizens could often 
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best be done at convenient courthouses in lawsuits brought by 
private plaintiffs seeking compensation for harms suffered at the 
hands of Big Business.   
 
The first major efforts to regulate practices of Big Business in the new 
national economy were the Interstate Commerce Act of 18872 and 
the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890.3 An important feature of the latter 
law was a provision entitling a plaintiff proving himself to be a victim 
of unlawful conduct to be compensated three times over.  The stated 
aim of triple compensation was to encourage private enforcement of 
public law.  The Congress of the United States in that enactment 
implicitly recognized that the national bureaucracy that would be 
needed to enforce such a law effectively was not available, and would 
in any case be unable to secure the requisite trust of a public so 
divided as America was by region, class, and ethnicity. 
 
The United States has since continued to rely heavily, although 
seldom exclusively, on private law enforcers similar to those 
encouraged to enforce the antitrust laws.  I offer one example from 
recent times.4  In 1996, Shintech, a Japanese subsidiary of Shin 
CIVIL PROCEDURE AND TRANSNATIONAL RIGHTS: 5 
Etsu, was recruited by the government of the state of Louisiana to 
build a factory there.  Substantial tax incentives were promised.  The 
company proposed to build a $700 million polyvinyl chloride plant  
in Convent, Louisiana. The plant would consist of three factories and 
an incinerator.  The governor and the legislature of Louisiana 
celebrated the coming of a new source of wealth and jobs. 
 
But Convent is located in the center of “Cancer Alley,” one of the 
most polluted communities in America.  Its population suffers from a 
very high rate of cancer and other medical problems associated with 
bad air.  The proposed Shintech plant would each year emit an 
additional 600,000 pounds of toxic chemicals into the air.  As one 
might expect, the population residing in Cancer Alley consists largely 
of people who cannot afford to live elsewhere.  Unsurprisingly, the 
population was substantially Afro-American.   
 
The reaction of the people of Convent differed from what one might 
expect in a similar situation in other nations.  One impoverished but 
aggressive African-American female citizen of Convent organized a 
lawsuit and went to the courthouse.  She and her neighbors sued 
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Shintech asking a federal court to prevent construction of its plant as 
a violation of federal law.  There were of course both state and 
federal agencies responsible for protecting the environment.  But 
none was responsive to the plaintiffs until their lawsuit attracted wide 
public notice. 
 
The government of Louisiana was enraged.  They not only opposed 
the lawsuit but threatened to withdraw public funding for the university 
law school if its clinical teacher representing the plaintiffs did not 
dismiss the case.  The teacher resigned from the university  
and continued to represent the plaintiffs, knowing that the federal law 
required that he be well compensated by the defendants should he 
win the case.5  The federal agency began to share their concerns.   
The outcome was a victory for the plaintiffs.  Shintech gave up its 
plan to build in Convent. 
 
How was it possible for these impoverished citizens to beat not only 
Business but the state and federal governments?  The plaintiffs were 
able to deploy numerous devices of civil procedure that serve to 
empower private plaintiffs serving public aims at the same time that 
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they serve their own.  Together, these procedural devices can be 
seen as a standing invitation to Americans to bring their grievances to 
the courthouse.  To courthouses that are often architectural events  
dominating the landscape, much as cathedrals often dominate 
European landscapes. 
 
First of these inviting principles is the American Rule that frees the 
plaintiffs from any risk of liability for the defendant’s legal expenses, 
even if the plaintiffs suffers an adverse judgment on the merits. 6 
There is also law allowing lawyers to serve their clients for fees to be 
paid only if they succeed, and then only from the proceeds of victory.  
And there are statutes, such as federal laws protecting the 
environment that require a losing defendant to pay the plaintiff’s 
attorney even though no such obligation is imposed on a losing 
plaintiff.  This is known as the one-way fee shift. 
 
Second, there is the identity of the decision makers at the democratic 
courthouse.  Most trial judges in America are accountable to voters.7  
And for those who mistrust the judge assigned to their case, there is 
generally the right to trial by jury, even in civil cases.8  Juries, 
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whatever their failings, can almost never be bribed or intimidated.  
Courthouse decision makers are therefore seldom beholden to a 
ruling class.  Such courts tend sometimes to be more responsive to 
popular concerns than are legislatures or executive officers. 
 
Third, there is public access to information needed to win private 
claims enforcing public law.  Most information in the hands of 
government is available to private plaintiffs.9  And the discovery rules 
familiar to American courts enable plaintiffs to secure not only the 
testimony under oath of virtually every adult in the land, but also 
access to most files in their possession, including their electronic 
files.10 
 
Fourth, there is the possibility of aggregating the claims of victims, not 
only for the sake of efficiency, but also so that lawyers for a group of 
lesser claims can hope for sufficient compensation to make it worth 
their efforts to engage in vigorous advocacy including vigorous 
discovery to present the strongest possible case against public 
malefactors.11  There is also the states’ laws of damages that offers 
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compensation for pain and suffering, and the prospect of punitive 
damages sufficient to deter repetitive misdeeds. 
 
Partly as a result of these features, there are about a million lawyers 
in the United States.  Less than a tenth of that number are primarily 
devoted to the representation of individual plaintiffs bringing claims 
against corporate defendants accused of misdeeds harmful to 
workers, consumers, investors, or the environment.  A roughly equal 
number advise and represent government agencies who share with 
them responsibility for the enforcement of laws protecting workers, 
consumers, small investors, patients, or the environment.  A major 
source of employment of the lawyers found in the vast American law 
firms is the opportunity to protect Business from private claims that 
incidentally serve public, regulatory purposes. 
 
Of course, many business executives protest that American civil 
procedure brings forth many false or frivolous claims.  The empirical 
evidence solidly refutes that claim.12  Contingent fee lawyers are not 
often seen to file claims that are doomed to fail.  Defense lawyers 
who charge their clients by the hour, on the other hand, frequently are 
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found to be presenting weak defenses in which they have invested 
many compensable hours of professional services.  But few American 
businessmen publicly express a desire to be governed by more 
congenial European civil procedure if that choice must be 
accompanied by European-style bureaucracies fully empowered to 
enforce public law. 
 
There would, as I have said, be less need for so many lawyers and 
so much dependence on private law enforcement if the United States 
were a smaller or more homogeneous nation.  That observation 
suggests to me that the efforts to globalize the world economy might 
possibly profit from a consideration of the American experience.  
There are at least two major problems presented by global conditions 
that might be thought to call for an American-style system of private 
law enforcement on a global scale.  Private enforcement is needed 
with respect to those matters of transnational import because they, 
like the problems of transcontinental import that confounded the 
national government of the United States, cannot be plausibly 
entrusted to either a global or a local national bureaucracy. 
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The two problems I identify are transnational environmental pollution 
and the corruption of foreign governments.   International laws 
addressing either of these problems are unlikely to be effectively 
enforced by any world government I am able to imagine, whether a 
branch of the United Nations, or of the World Trade Organization, or 
of an institution not yet created. 
 
Consider the Kyoto Accord now in force as an international 
agreement regarding carbon emissions.  Will its standards be 
effectively enforced?  If so, by whom?  Might the lawyer who 
represented the citizens of Convent, Louisiana, and others of his sort, 
be summoned to perform the task?  Lawrence Summers, later the 
president of Harvard University, expressed a view shared by many 
who possess economic power when he urged that the lethal waste 
created by industrial nations should be shipped to poor nations where 
the economic consequences of the inevitable biological harms are 
less costly.13  The injustice that results from such practices is 
obvious.   
 
CIVIL PROCEDURE AND TRANSNATIONAL RIGHTS: 12 
For example, in 2006, Transfigura, a Dutch oil trading firm employed 
an Ivory Coast contractor to take hundreds of tons of toxic waste from 
the hold of a ship.  The cost of removal of the waste in Amsterdam 
was said to be perhaps as much as $600,000.  To avoid that 
expense, the African firm was created and hired for $30,000 to 
dispose of the material.  It waste was deposited in numerous 
locations around Abidjian.14  At least ten people died as a result, and 
about 100,000 people sought medical treatment.   Transfigura then 
paid the government of Ivory Coast $200 million to settle all claims.15  
Whether the sum paid is realistic compensation for the harm done 
and how that money will be used by the government are questions 
that abide.  We are told that a criminal investigation proceeds in the 
Netherlands and that a class action has been filed in Britain on behalf 
of thousands of plaintiffs.   
 
This last is an acknowledgment that the American system of private 
enforcement of public law is a potentially important device in dealing 
with the problems of transnational environmental pollution.  The 
governments of industrial nations, like those of 19th century American 
states, have inadequate incentives to protect those outside their 
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boundaries from injuries caused by their own citizens.  And the 
governments of “developing” nations are too weak and too vulnerable 
to bribery or intimidation to protect their environments from harms 
caused by malefactors outside their control. 
 
Indeed, consider the problem of transnational corruption.  Corruption 
is of course a problem in all nations.  But it is most serious where it 
does the most harm, in those weak and failing states in which public 
officials despair of effective public service.  In 1974, the United States 
made it a crime to bribe an official of a foreign government.16  Firms 
have been prosecuted under that law, and some civil claims have 
arisen against firms causing harm by using bribery to get economic 
advantages.17  The Department of State acknowledges that private 
civil claims are an essential feature of the American law deterring 
bribery of foreign officials.18  But of course, in the global marketplace 
American firms compete with firms from other nations.  If an 
American firm obeys the law and refuses to pay a bribe, and thereby 
loses a business opportunity to a Belgian firm that pays the bribe 
requested, the American law may have operated to the disadvantage 
of its citizens and its national economy.  In 1997, recognizing this 
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problem, the United States initiated an international convention 
obligating the signing states to enforce criminal laws prohibiting 
transnational  bribery.19  And now the United Nations has 
promulgated a similar instrument.20  And the World Bank is seeking 
means to prevent the waste of its loans that go into the pockets of 
bribed officials.21   
 
In 2006, controlling transnational corruption is in high fashion in 
Europe.22  But can national governments realistically be expected to 
faithfully prosecute and punish their own citizens and businesses for 
conduct that is beneficial to their own people, however harmful it may 
be to the governments of other lands?  There will be some 
prosecutions, but I question whether in the end such treaties are 
more than benign gestures that acknowledge but do not significantly 
relieve the problem of transnational corruption. 
 
Might we be able to create a transnational civil procedure that could 
entertain claims made by private plaintiffs who seek compensation for 
environmental harms or for economic harms resulting from 
transnational bribery?  Imagine the plaintiffs drawn from the 
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population of a failed state, say Somalia or Haiti or Bangladesh, 
whose fragile environment has been sullied by an American firm, or a 
Belgian one.   Or imagine the plaintiff as a firm that failed to receive a 
government contract because a competitor paid by a bribe to the 
contract-awarding officials.  If a forum were available to hear and 
enforce their claims, might it not be expected to resemble in some 
respects the democratic courthouses found across the United States?  
Would it not be necessary, if effective private enforcement is to be 
achieved, to provide abundant economic incentives for the private 
lawyers who would seek to enforce environmental rights?  Would it 
not be equally important to empower private lawyers to thoroughly 
investigate possible environmental wrongs or bribery of public 
officials?  Might it even be wise to engage in decision-making 
disinterested persons who have no political or professional ambitions 
that might be jeopardized by decisions unwelcome to their own 
governments?  Could such a process be devised within the present 
framework of European institutions so that Somalians or Haitians or 
Bangladeshi might be effectively enabled to deter environmental 
wrongs committed by European firms?  Or so that firms could be 
deterred from paying bribes by the knowledge that they are subject to 
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suits stripping them of any profits gained as a consequence of such 
corrupt payments?  Could we not at least confer on European 
institutions a duty to enforce judgments rendered in democratic 
courthouses on such private claims enforcing international laws? 
 
I have no firm answers to these questions.  I mean only to suggest 
the possibility that there may be lessons to learn from the American 
experience.  The United States cannot be said to have found in its 
experience governing an interstate economy the solutions to the 
problems of transnational pollution and corruption, but it has perhaps 
identified the issues to be considered if either of these cosmic 
problems are ever to be effectively addressed.  The reader is invited 
to join in such a consideration. 
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